Recent Developments under Section 8(b)(4) by Asher, Lester
SMU Law Review
Volume 16 | Issue 1 Article 6
1962
Recent Developments under Section 8(b)(4)
Lester Asher
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in SMU Law Review by
an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Lester Asher, Recent Developments under Section 8(b)(4), 16 Sw L.J. 113 (1962)
https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr/vol16/iss1/6
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS UNDER SECTION 8(b)(4)
by
Lester Asher*
T HE scheme of the Taft-Hartley Act,' made it an unfair labor
practice for a union to induce or encourage "the employees of
any employer to engage in a strike or a concerted refusal in the
course of their employment" for certain specified objectives. How-
ever, since the Taft-Hartley Act carefully defines the words "em-
ployee" and "employer," the National Labor Relations Board held
that it was not unlawful to induce supervisors, since they were not
"employees" within the meaning of the Act;' and that it was not
unlawful to induce persons who worked for organizations such as
municipalities, railroads, or airlines, since they were not "employers"
within the meaning of the Act.' Also in a few cases under Taft-
Hartley, it was held that inducement of a single employee was not
illegal since it did not involve a concerted refusal to work.' Finally,
and most important, since the language of the Taft-Hartley Act
only prohibited inducing or encouraging "employees," the Board
ruled that Section 8 (b) (4) did not prevent a union from putting
pressure directly on a secondary employer, as distinguished from his
employees, to induce him to stop dealing with the primary employer
Direct pressure on the employer, even by outright threats of strikes
or reprisals against him, was not an unfair labor practice under the
scheme of the Taft-Hartley Act.
I. THE LANDRUM-GRIFFIN AMENDMENTS
The Landrum-Griffin Act' plugged up these so-called loopholes
by amending Section 8 (b) (4) to set up two separate categories of
*B.A., J.D., University of Chicago; former attorney, regional attorney, secretary,
National Labor Relations Board; Lecturer, University of Chicago, Roosevelt College; General
Counsel, Illinois State Federation of Labor, AFL-CIO; Attorney at Law, Chicago, Illinois.
This Article was adapted from a speech delivered to the Eighth Annual Institute on
Labor Law, Southwestern Legal Foundation, Dallas, Texas, November 3, 1961.
1Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§
151-68 (1956).
Carpenters Dist. Council v. NLRB, 274 F.2d 564 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
a Railroads: Lumber & Sawmill Workers, 122 N.L.R.B. 1403 (1959); United Hatters,
121 N.L.R.B. 1154, 1155 (1958); Teamsters Union, 121 N.L.R.B. 315, 319 (1958).
Municipal Corporations: Local 833, UAW, 116 N.L.R.B. 267, 270-71 (1956).
'Joliet Contractors Ass'n v. NLRB, 202 F.2d 606 (7th Cir. 1953); Glaziers Union,
99 N.L.R.B. 1391 (1952).
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U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1961).
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
prohibited conduct or activities. First, amended 8 (b) (4) (i) for-
bids a union from inducing or encouraging "any individual employed
by any person" to engage "in a strike or a refusal" in the course of
his employment. It should be noted that in the amended section the
words "employees" and "concerted" have been deleted. The amended
law uses the term "individual employed by any person." Clearly,
under the scheme of Landrum-Griffin, the law would now apply to
an employee of a municipality, a railroad, or a farm. Also, the loop-
hole as to an individual employee is now closed, because the word
"concerted" is dropped from the statute; thus, the inducement of a
single employee of a secondary employer is now prohibited.
Landrum-Griffin also set up a second class of prohibited conduct
or activities. Section 8 (b) (4) (ii) makes it an unfair labor practice
for a union or its agent "to threaten, coerce or restrain any person
engaged in commerce" for any one of the illegal objectives. At this
point, there are still two loopholes left unclosed: (1) the Taft-
Hartley ruling that it was not unlawful to induce supervisors; and
(2) the ruling that a union could induce, encourage, and put pres-
sure upon an employer. Obviously, the objective of 8 (b) (4) (ii)
is to prohibit the threatening, coercing, and restraining of "any
person," and that would certainly include an employer.
A. "Individual Employed By Any Person"
Section 8 (b) (4) (i) forbids a union from inducing "any indi-
vidual employed by any person" to engage in a refusal to work in
the course of his employment. What does this new term mean? Does
it cover inducement of all management officials or refer only to
low-level supervisors? The trial examiners of the National Labor
Relations Board were much divided on this issue. The General Coun-
sel urged that the term "individual employed by any person" covers
all management officials. Finally in March 1961, in the leading case
of Carolina Lumber Co.,7 the Board decided the issue. After analyzing
the legislative history at length, the Board concluded:
The above quoted legislative history indicates that among the class of
individuals to be insulated from "inducement" are supervisors who,
although they are management's representatives at a low level, are
through their work, associations, and interests, still closely aligned with
those whom they direct and oversee.
There are additional statements in the legislative history which indicate
that only inducement of low level supervisors was meant to be out-
lawed by 8 (b) (4) (i). In addition, the broad reading of "individual




employed by any person" urged by the General Counsel would render
8 (b) (4) (ii) largely superfluous. The latter refers to threats, restraint
and coercion of "any person." To threaten a person is to induce him.
Accordingly, if "individual employed by any person" refers to all
managerial officials, irrespective of placement in the hierarchy, the
specific outlawing of coercive tactics was unnecessary. Any interpreta-
tion of the statute is to be avoided which would make one section of
the Act meaningless. We believe that the two sections are in fact
reconcilable. As indicated by the legislative history, the term "indi-
vidual employed by any person" in 8 (b) (4) (i) refers to supervisors
who in interest are more nearly related to rank-and-file employees than
to management, as the term is generally understood. On the other
hand, the term "person" as used in 8 (b) (4) (ii) would seem to refer
to individuals more nearly related to the managerial level. So construed
8 (b) (4) (i) would outlaw attempts to induce or encourage em-
ployees and some supervisors, to achieve the objectives proscribed by
8 (b) (4). Similar attempts to induce or encourage others more nearly
related to the managerial level for the same objectives would be law-
ful. However, if in the latter case the labor organization went be-
yond persuasion and attempted to coerce such managerial officials to
accomplish the proscribed objectives, it would violate 8 (b) (4) (ii).
This leaves for determination whether in a given case inducement
was directed at a supervisor who is an "individual employed by any
person" within the meaning of 8 (b) (4) (i). No single across-the-
board line on an organization chart can be drawn to determine in
every case whether a supervisor is an "individual employed by any
person." The authority and position of supervisors vary from company
to company. It will therefore be necessary in each case in determining
this question to examine such factors as the organizational setup of
the company, the authority, responsibility and background of the
supervisors, and their working conditions, duties and functions on the
job involved in this dispute, salary, earnings, perquisites and benefits.
No single factor will be determinative.
In the Carolina Lumber Co. case, the Board found that a project
superintendent who was free to exercise authority, including requisi-
tioning and purchasing supplies, without immediate on-the-job
supervision, was not an "individual." However, the Board also
found that a working foreman, who had no authority beyond super-
vising a small group of laborers, was an "individual" within the
meaning of 8 (b) (4) (i). To complete the statutory scheme, there
must also be an illegal objective. Thus, where the Board found in
the Carolina Lumber Co. case that the working foreman was an
individual within the meaning of clause (i), it then went on to
find that he had been induced by the union to cease using materials
1962)
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supplied by the Carolina Lumber Company, which was an illegal
objective under subparagraph (B) as follows:
forcing or requiring any person to cease using, selling, handling, trans-
porting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer,
processor, or manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any other
person....
The Board found that the working foreman, Clay, was working for
the Persun Construction Company on a Marshall College job in
Huntington, West Virginia. The union agents followed a truck of
Carolina Lumber Company, against whom there was a labor dis-
pute, and approached Clay, the working foreman, while he was
working on some flooring which had been delivered by Carolina
Lumber. The union agents told Clay, "You know it's wrong to
handle that flooring. You will bust our union if you handle it."
Clay then instructed his crew to stop handling the flooring. The
Board found that the union violated 8 (b) (4) (i) (B) of the Act
by inducing Clay and the workers employed by Persun Construction
Company to cease using materials supplied by Carolina Lumber with
an object of forcing Persun to stop doing business with Carolina
Lumber.
B. "To Threaten, Coerce, Or Restrain"
How has the National Labor Relations Board interpreted the
new language introduced by the Landrum-Griffin Act in Section
8 (b) (4) (ii)-"to threaten, coerce, or restrain any person. . . ."? In
the Gilmore Constr. Co. case,8 the Board held that this new language
was violated when the union picketed a construction project be-
cause the general contractor had employed a non-union subcontractor
and the union informed the general contractor that the picketing
would stop only if the subcontractor were removed from the job.
The Board pointed out that picketing constituted the necessary
C"coercion and restraint" under the new language.
In the Consalvo Trucking case,' the union president told officials
of the general contractor that the project was "a union job and it
was to remain a union job" and that no truck would operate unless
all were driven by union members. Another union official said that
the union would remove its members from the job unless all trucks
on the project were union trucks. The Board held that these state-
ments constituted threats within the meaning of the new language.
'international Hod Carriers (Gilmore Constr. Co.), 127 N.L.R.B. 541, 46 L.R.R.M.
1043 (1960).
'Excavating & Bldg. Material, Chauffeurs, & Helpers (Consalvo Trucking Co.), 132
N.L.R.B. No. 64, 48 L.R.R.M. 1444 (1961).
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The Board also ruled" that a warning to a company that it could
expect trouble because it awarded a contract for carpentry work to
a non-union contractor, with an object of forcing the company to
cancel the contract violates 8 (b) (4) (ii) (B). The Board also con-
cluded that a work stoppage for a proscribed purpose clearly violates
8 (b) (4) (ii).",
In the Martin Co. case,"2 the Board found that the union induced
and encouraged its members not to accept referral to and employ-
ment by Gable Electric Service, an electrical contractor. It found
further that an object of the activity was to force the electrical
contractor to cease handling cables prefabricated by the Martin
Company and that such inducement and encouragement constituted
a refusal to refer applicants for employment to Gable, the electrical
contractor, as provided in the union's area agreement. The Board
found that when polling those in the hiring hall as to whether they
would accept employment with Gable, Palmer, the union Business
Agent,
was far from subtle as to the position of the union respecting the
work Gable wanted done. Palmer's statement that the work consisted
of installing cables and that Gable wanted men to replace workers who
had been discharged for refusing to install cables, clearly indicated to
those in the hiring hall that they should not accept referral to Gable.
Palmer's action here was but a continuation of the union's policy which
had led to the original unlawful inducement and encouragement of
Gable's employees; the discouragement of those in the hiring hall from
accepting employment with Gable was ... tantamount to a categorical
refusal to make a referral.
The Board concluded that this conduct, of inducing and en-
couraging members of the union not to accept referral to or em-
ployment by Gable, constituted a refusal to refer applicants for
employment to Gable and also violated 8 (b) (4) (ii) (B).
In the Riss & Co. case,'3 the Board held that the inducement of an
employee, under the circumstances of that case, also coerced and
restrained his employer. In Riss & Co., the Board found that the
union agents had physically prevented the secondary employee from
carrying out his assigned task by uncoupling his equipment and
warning him to leave the premises. The necessary effect of the
union seizure of this equipment owned by the secondary employer,
'"Lafayette Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council (Southern Constr. Corp.), 132 N.L.R.B.
No. 49, 48 L.R.R.M. 1406 (1961).
"Local 825, Operating Engineers Union (Carleton Bros. Co.), 131 N.L.R.B. No. 67,
48 L.R.R.M. 1069 (1961).
"2Local 756, IUEW (Martin Co.), 131 N.L.R.B. No. 120, 48 L.R.R.M. 1172 (1961).




said the Board, was forcibly to obstruct the secondary employer
from carrying on its business with the primary employer. The Board
ruled that such conduct was directly coercive of the secondary em-
ployee and violative of 8 (b) (4) (ii) (B). However, the Board noted
that "we do not mean to imply that any inducement or encourage-
ment of a secondary employee, under 8 (b) (4) (i) (B), is necessarily
restraint and coercion of his employer under 8 (b) (4) (ii) (B)."
In Layne-Western Co.,'4 the Board concluded that there was no
violation of 8 (b) (4) (ii):
The complaint also alleges that Local 571 further threatened, re-
strained and coerced persons engaged in commerce or in an industry
affecting commerce by letter Local 571 sent to all contractors in the
Omaha area on October 26, 1960 purporting to inform them of the
facts of Local 571's dispute with Layne-Western. The letter stated
that Layne-Western had no signed collective bargaining agreement
with Local 571, and had refused to pay the union scale and conditions
to employees within the jurisdiction of Local 571. The letter went on
to say that these facts were presented for "the purpose of information
only . . . " and concluded with the statement: "The presence of
Layne-Western Company on any job will create legal and economic
problems for the members of our Union." As we do not find that this
letter threatened, restrained or coerced any person within the meaning
of Section 8 (b) (4) (ii) of the Act, we shall dismiss this allegation of
the complaint.
Similarly, the Board decided in the Floyd W. Drake case'5 that
the giving of notice to the prime contractor of a prospective strike
action against a subcontractor was not a violation of 8 (b) (4) (ii) (B).
In Brewer's City Coal Dock,"6 the Board held that the union did
not threaten, coerce, or restrain the secondary employer in violation
of 8 (b) (4) (ii) (B) of the Act, when the union's business agent did
not threaten the secondary employer with any reprisals if the sec-
ondary employer accepted the delivery of sand from the primary
employer, but merely informed him of the existence of the strike
against the primary employer and appealed to him not to use the
primary employer's sand until the strike was over.
II. CONSUMER PICKETING AND CONSUMER HANDBILLING
What have been the National Labor Relations Board rulings con-
cerning consumer picketing and consumer handbilling? The leading
4 Operating Engineers Union (Layne-Western Co.), 133 N.L.R.B. No. 27, 48 L.R.R.M.
1627 (1961).
"Construction, Bldg., & Miscellaneous Drivers (Floyd W. Drake), 133 N.L.R.B. No.
116, 48 L.R.R.M. 1790 (1961).
"GLocal 324, Operating Engineers Union (Brewer's City Coal Dock), 131 N.L.R.B. No.
36, 48 L.R.R.M. 1013 (1961).
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case on consumer handbilling is Lohman Sales Co.,' decided in
August 1961, a four to one decision, with Board member Rodgers
dissenting. The Lohnan decision involves one of the "puzzling pro-
visos" brought into the statute by the Landrum-Griffin Act. This
proviso to Section 8 (b) (4) protects
publicity, other than picketing, for the purpose of truthfully advising
the public, including consumers and members of labor organization,
that a product or products are produced by an employer with whom
the labor organization has a primary dispute and are distributed by
another employer, as long as such publicity does not have an effect of
inducing any individual employed by any person other than the primary
employer in the course of his employment to refuse to pick up, deliver,
or transport any goods, or not to perform any services, at the establish-
ment of the employer engaged in such distribution; ....
The Lohman case grew out of a labor dispute between the Inter-
national Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 537, and Lohman Sales
Company of Denver, Colorado, the primary employer, a wholesale
distributor of cigars, cigarettes, candy, and sundries. The Teamsters
visited several drug stores and supermarkets in Denver, which were
purchasers of Lohman's products, and handed out "Do Not Buy"
circulars on the sidewalks and in parking lots to customers of the
retail stores. Some of the owners and other personnel of the retail
stores were requested not to purchase from Lohman and were
threatened with distribution of handbills if they did not stop deal-
ing with Lohman. The Board, by a unanimous vote, found a viola-
tion of 8 (b) (4) (i) (B) based upon the oral appeals by the union
to neutral employees not to order or buy products from Lohman,
the primary employer. However, it found no violations of 8 (b) (4) -
(ii) (B) and concluded that the handbilling was protected by the
proviso. The Board also ruled the union's threat to handbill, made
to neutral employers, was lawful under the Act because the hand-
billing was lawful. With respect to the handbilling, the major issue
in the case was whether the secondary boycott proviso, permitting
publicity other than picketing, applies only in situations where the
primary employer is a manufacturer or whether it applies also where
the primary dispute is with other types of enterprises. The four-
member majority of the Board took the latter position. In view of
the importance of this decision that handbilling is publicity which
is protected by the proviso, it is quite certain that this case will be
litigated up to the Supreme Court.
1




The leading cases on consumer picketing are Minneapolis House
Furnishing Co.," decided in July 1961, and the Tree Fruits Labor
Relations Comm. case," decided late in August 1961. The Tree Fruits
case points up the typical facts involved in a dispute which results
in consumer picketing. The Tree Fruits Labor Relations Committee
represented twenty-one fresh fruit packing and warehousing firms
in Washington in collective bargaining with Teamsters Local 760.
When negotiations broke down, the Teamsters called a strike against
the employers and also promoted a consumer boycott of Washing-
ton State apples. The Teamsters instituted a program of picketing
and handbilling at the premises of Safeway stores in Seattle, which
were then selling apples obtained from employer-members of Tree
Fruits.
In the Tree Fruits decision, the NLRB concluded as follows:
In that case [the Perfection Mattress case]" ° a majority of the Board
held that a picket line at the premises of a secondary employer neces-
sarily invites employees to make common cause with the picketing
union and to refrain from working behind the picket line, irrespective
of the literal appeal of the legends on the picket sign. Accordingly, the
majority concluded that the picketing of retail stores with signs urging
customers not to buy products of the primary employer constituted
inducement or encouragement of employees of neutral employers
within the meaning of Section 8 (b) (4) (i) of the Act. The Board has
reconsidered this doctrine of the Perfection Mattress case and a ma-
jority has now decided that picketing of a secondary employer's
premises does not per se constitute inducement or encouragement of
employees of neutrals within the meaning of clause (i) of Section
8 (b) (4), nor does it raise an irrebuttable presumption as to the intent
or probable consequences of the picketing. [Minneapolis House Fur-
nishing] Whether in any given case picketing is intended or calculated
to "induce or encourage" employees of secondary employers to engage
in a work stoppage or refusal to perform services is to be determined
by all the evidence in that particular case and not by an a priori
assumption.
In the present case, all the evidence indicates that by their picketing
of the Safeway stores, Respondents did not intend that employees of
Safeway or of other neutral persons should engage in work stoppage;
nor were cessations of work likely to occur as the result of such picket-
ing. Thus, the picketing was confined to store customer entrances. The
signs carried by the pickets were addressed specifically to consumers
and urged them not to buy Washington State apples sold in the store.
'SUpholsterers, Frame, & Bedding Workers (Minneapolis House Furnishing Co.), 132
N.L.R.B. No. 2, 48 L.R.R.M. 1301 (1961).
" Fruit & Vegetable Packers & Warehousemen (Tree Fruits Labor Relations Comm.,
Inc.), 132 N.L.R.B. No. 102, 48 L.R.R.M. 1496 (1961).
2 United Wholesale & Warehouse Employees (Perfection Mattress & Spring Co.), 129
N.L.R.B. No. 125, 47 L.R.R.M. 1121 (1960).
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The handbills similarly only urged consumers not to buy such apples.
Written instructions to pickets issued by Respondents cautioned the
pickets to limit their picketing to consumer entrances, and not to
interfere with store employees or with pickups and deliveries. The
notice to store managers gave the cause of the dispute and specifically
stated that it was not intended that any employees cease work as the
result of the picketing. This notice also asked store managers to report
any work stoppages or difficulties with pickups or deliveries so that
Local 760 could take steps to correct the situation immediately.
Finally, the picketing had no effect on store employees or on employees
of suppliers.
As the foregoing evidence indicates that Respondents' picketing was
directed at consumers only, and was not intended to "induce or en-
courage" employees of Safeway or of its suppliers to engage in
any kind of action, we find that by such picketing Respondents did
not violate Section 8 (b) (4) (i) (B) of the Act.
Although the picketing followed here did not violate Section 8 (b)
(4) (i) (B), it did violate Section 8 (b) (4) (ii) (B). In the Minneapolis
House Furnishing case the Board unanimously reiterated that "by
literal wording of the proviso [to Section 8 (b) (4) ] as well as
through the interpretive gloss placed thereon by its drafters, con-
sumer picketing in front of a secondary establishment is prohibited."
Such picketing "threaten[s], coerce[s], or restrain[s]" persons within
the meaning of Section 8 (b) (4) (ii). And when it has for an object
forcing or requiring any person to cease selling or handling the products
of any other producer or processor the picketing violates Section
8 (b) (4) (ii) (B). In the present case the picketing had one of these
proscribed objectives. The purpose of picketing the Safeway stores
was to persuade consumers not to purchase nonunion Washington
State apples which Safeway in turn purchased from members of
Tree Fruits. The natural and foreseeable result of such picketing, if
successful, would be to force or require Safeway to reduce or to dis-
continue altogether its purchases of such apples from the struck
employers. It is reasonable to infer, and we do, that Respondents in-
tended this natural and foreseeable result. Accordingly, we find that
the foregoing picketing violated Section 8 (b) (4) (ii) (B) of the Act.
It can certainly be expected that these rulings on consumer
picketing will be carried to the highest court by the labor unions
involved.
III. THE "GATE" CASES
It is important to note in this discussion of Section 8 (b) (4) cases
that the Landrum-Griffin Act did not change the concepts of what
is proper primary activity. The first proviso of the three new pro-
visos which Landrum-Griffin added to Section 8 (b) (4) is appended
to Section 8 (b) (4) (B) and states that "nothing contained in this
1962]
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clause (B) shall be construed to make unlawful, where not other-
wise unlawful, any primary strike or primary picketing."
On May 29, 1961, the United States Supreme Court decided Local
761, IUEW v. NLRB,"' and set forth an excellent analysis of the
NLRB decisions and the importance of the distinction between
legitimate "primary activity" and banned "secondary activity." The
facts in this case were as follows: General Electric Corporation oper-
ated a plant outside Louisville, Kentucky, known as Appliance Park.
The plant had five gates. One of the gates, known as Gate 3-A, was
designated for the use of all employees of independent contractors
who worked on the premises of Appliance Park. GE employees
were required to use other gates. The independent contractors, whose
employees used Gate 3-A, were utilized for a great variety of tasks.
Some did construction work on new buildings; some installed and
repaired ventilation and heating equipment; some engaged in re-
tooling and rearranging operations necessary to the manufacture of
new models; others did "general maintenance work." Local 761 of
the IUEW was the certified bargaining representative for the GE
production and maintenance workers. On July 27, 1958, the Union
called a strike because of unsettled grievances with the Company.
Picketing occurred at all of the gates including Gate 3-A. The signs
carried by the pickets at all gates read: "Local 761 on Strike. G.E.
Unfair." Due to the picketing, almost all the employees of indepen-
dent contractors refused to enter the company premises. The Com-
pany contended that the picketing before Gate 3-A was prohibited
by the provisions of 8 (b) (4) (A) of the Taft-Hartley Act."
The Supreme Court remanded the case to the National Labor
Relations Board to determine what kind of work was being done by
the independent contractors whose employees were using Gate 3-A.
The Court held that if the Gate was being used solely by workers
of independent contractors who were performing tasks unconnected
to the normal operations of GE (such as construction work on the
Company's buildings) the picketing of Gate 3-A was illegal. How-
ever, if the separate gate were being used for regular plant deliveries,
the barring of picketing at that location would be a clear invasion
of the rights of the union to appeal to neutral employees whose tasks
aid the employer's everyday operations. If the gate was being used
by the employees of both types of independent contractors, then
the picketing of Gate 3-A was legal. In the words of the Court:
2'366 U.S. 667 (1961 ).22 Under the Landrum-Griffin amendments of 1959, this became § 8 (b) (4) (B).
[Vol. 16
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The legal path by which the Board and the Court of Appeals reached
their decisions did not take into account that if Gate 3-A was in fact
used by employees of independent contractors who performed con-
ventional maintenance work necessary to the normal operations of
General Electric, the use of the gate would have been a mingled one
outside the bar of Section 8 (b) (4) (A). In short, such mixed use of
this portion of the struck employer's premises would not bar picketing
rights of the striking employees. While the record shows some such
mingled use, it sheds no light on its extent.
The Court further stated that if the amount of maintenance
work performed by the employees of independent contractors using
the gate was inconsequential in comparison to the amount of con-
struction work performed, then the maintenance work could be dis-
regarded by the Board in reaching a decision as to whether the picket-
ing of Gate 3-A was legal.
Subsequent to the Supreme Court's decision in the Local 761
case, the Board decided the Carrier Corp.3 case in which a spur of
the New York Central Railroad ran alongside and immediately south
of the Carrier plant. The Carrier plant was bounded on the west by
Thompson Road. The railroad spur was used to serve Carrier and
other plants in the adjacent area. The railroad right-of-way, which
was owned by the railroad, was enclosed by a chain fence along its
south boundary, which fence was a continuation of one enclosing
the Carrier property on the west. Access to the right-of-way was
provided by a chain link gate immediately east of the point where
the spur crossed Thompson Road. The Steelworkers, who were on
strike against Carrier, maintained pickets at the Thompson Road
railroad gate, threatened railroad personnel and blocked the trains
passage. Contrary to the Trial Examiner, the NLRB, by a 4-1 vote,
with member Rodgers dissenting, ruled that the Steelworkers had
not violated 8 (b) (4) (i) and (ii) (B) of the Act. The Board held
that the Local 761 decision of the Supreme Court was dispositive of
the issue in this Carrier Corp. case and stated:
While the gate here through which the New York Central train
passed was not one reserved by Carrier for the New York Central's
use, but was in fact one on a right-of-way owned by the railroad, we
do not consider this fact to be material. The "key to the problem,"
as the Court stated, is to be found in the type of work being done by
those passing through the gate. If the work is unrelated to the normal
operations of the primary employer, picketing at that gate will violate
the secondary boycott prohibition of the Act. On the other hand, if
this work is related to normal plant operations, the secondary boycott
23Local S895, United Steelworkers of America (Carrier Corp.), 132 N.L.R.B. No. 17,
48 L.R.R.M. 1319 (1961).
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prohibition does not apply. As stated above, the services performed
by New York Central for Carrier-the delivery of empty box cars
to Carrier and the transportation of Carrier products-clearly were
related to Carrier's normal operations. For this reason we find
that the Respondents did not violate Section 8 (b) (4) (i) (B) or
8 (b) (4) (ii) (B) ....
The Board also took particular pains to point out:
Contrary to our dissenting colleague, we are not seeking to revive a
doctrine that railroads and railroad employees are not, respectively,
"employers" and "employees" within the meaning of the secondary
boycott provisions of the Act. By its 1959 amendments, Congress
underscored its intention to give railroads the protection against sec-
ondary boycotts accorded other employers. But it did not seek to give
railroads or any other secondary employers immunity from lawful
primary picketing at entrances to the premises of primary employers.
This is further shown by the express proviso to Section 8 (b) (4) (B),
which Congress also adopted in 1959, namely, that "nothing con-
tained in this clause (B) shall be construed to make unlawful, where
not otherwise unlawful, any primary strike or primary picketing."
IV. SECTION 8 (b) (4) (C)
The illegal objective prohibited by clause (C) is "forcing or re-
quiring any employer to recognize or bargain with a particular labor
organization as the representative of his employees if another labor
organization has been certified as the representative of such em-
ployees ... "
Early in October 1961, the NLRB, by a 3-2 decision, with members
Rodgers and Leedom dissenting, handed down an extremely im-
portant decision in the Calumet Contractors Ass'n case." An in-
dependent union had been certified by the Board. Hod Carriers Local
41 engaged in picketing for the purpose of obtaining prevailing rates
and conditions. The president of Local 41 testified that there would
have been no picketing had the Association met the prevailing rates
of pay and conditions. It was stipulated by the parties at the hear-
ing that Local 41 did not request recognition or demand bargaining.
In its first decision issued in February 1961, the Board ruled that
one of the objects of Respondent's picketing was to force Dejong and
the Association to meet the "prevailing rate of pay and conditions" for
the area. It is well established that a Union's picketing for prevailing
rates of pay and conditions of employment constitutes an attempt to
obtain conditions normally resulting from collective bargaining, and
constitutes an attempt by the union to force itself on employees as
their bargaining agent.




Upon reconsideration, however, the Board dismissed the complaint
and held that
Respondent's admitted objective to require the Association and De-
Jong to conform standards of employment to those prevailing in the
area, is not tantamount to, nor does it have an objective of, recogni-
tion or bargaining. A union may legitimately be concerned that a
particular employer is undermining area standards of employment by
maintaining lower standards. It may be willing to forego recognition
and bargaining provided subnormal working conditions are eliminated
from area considerations. We are of the opinion that Section 8 (b) (4)-
(C) does not forbid such an objective.
It may be argued-with some justification-that picketing by an
outside union when another union has newly won Board certification
is an unwarranted harassment of the picketed employer. But this
is an argument that must be addressed to Congress. Section 8 (b) (4) (C),
as we read it, does not contain a broad proscription against all types
of picketing. It forbids only picketing with the objective of obtaining
"recognition and bargaining." On the record before us, Respondent
clearly disclaimed such an objective and sought only to eliminate sub-
normal working conditions from area considerations. As this objective
could be achieved without the Employer either bargaining with or
recognizing Respondent, we cannot, reasonably conclude that Respon-
dent's objective in picketing DeJong was to obtain "recognition or
bargaining." Accordingly we find no violation of Section 8 (b) (4) (C)
of the Act in the circumstances of this case.
It should be noted that Section 8 (b) (7) contains the same pro-
hibited object and makes it an unfair labor practice "to picket or
cause to be picketed, or threaten to picket or cause to be picketed,
any employer where an object thereof is forcing or requiring an
employer to recognize or bargain with a labor organization as the
representative of his employees. .. ."
In the Lewis Food Co. decision which was issued during 1956,25
with another union being certified, Local 626, Meat and Provision
Drivers Union, picketed the employer for the purpose of forcing
him to reinstate certain employees who were discharged, allegedly
because they were members of Local 626. Local 626 notified the
employer shortly after the picketing had begun that the picketing
would be terminated if the employer would reinstate the discharged
employees. The Board held that this was a strike to force or require
the employer to recognize and bargain with Local 626 as to this
matter, and, therefore, constituted a violation of 8 (b) (4) (C).
On October 27, 1961, the Board decided the Fanelli Ford Sales
"




case" which arose under 8 (b) (7). In the Fanelli case, which in-
volved only one union, the object of the union's picketing was to
protest the discharge of an employee and to have him returned to
work. The Board's decision, from which member Rodgers dissented,
concluded as follows:
It may not be gainsaid, of course, that picketing for an employee's re-
instatement may in some circumstances be used as a pretext for at-
taining recognition as collective bargaining representative of all the
employees in a certain unit. But before we are willing to infer such
broader objective, some more affirmative showing of such object must
be made than exists here. So far as this record indicates, Respondent's
picketing would have ceased if the Employer, without recognizing or,
indeed, exchanging a word with the Respondent, had reinstated Mar-
rone. We find in this case that the picketing was directed solely at
securing Marrone's reinstatement. We further find that such conduct
does not violate Section 8 (b) (7), of the Act. We accordingly overrule
Lewis Food to the extent inconsistent herewith.
V. SECTION 8 (e)
The Landrum-Griffin Act makes it an unfair labor practice for a
labor organization or its agents to engage in the prohibited conduct
set forth in Section 8 (b) (4) (i) and (ii) for the proscribed objec-
tive (A), i.e., "to enter into any agreement which is prohibited by
Section 8 (e)." Section 8 (e) which was added to the law by Lan-
drum-Griffin, without its provisos reads as follows:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for any labor organization and
any employer to enter into any contract or agreement, express or
implied, whereby such employer ceases or refrains or agrees to cease
or refrain from handling, using, selling, transporting or otherwise
dealing in any of the products of any other employer, or to cease
doing business with any other person, and any contract or agreement
entered into heretofore or hereafter containing such an agreement shall
be to such extent unenforcible and void ...
The Board's thinking in this connection is best reflected by study-
ing the clauses which have been found to be valid." In the Miami
Lithographers case,2" the Board upheld the validity of the "Struck
Work" paragraph (Section 19) with these words:
"Struck Work"
The "struck work" paragraph contains two parts: a general statement
26Local 259, UAW (Fanelli Ford Sales, Inc.), 133 N.L.R.B. No. 163, 49 L.R.R.M.
1021 (1961).
27 The best way to understand the rulings of the NLRB with respect to the kinds of
agreements that are prohibited by the terms of § 8 (e) and the kinds of agreements that
might be permissible is to set them out together. The leading decisions interpreting § 8(e)
are set out in the Appendix.
28 Amalgamated Lithographers of America (Employing Lithographers of Greater Miami,
Florida, and Miami Post Co.), 130 N.L.R.B. No. 107, 47 L.R.R.M. 1380 (1961).
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that the contracting company will not render production assistance
to any employer whose plant is struck by a local of the International,
and an implementation clause which provides that in carrying out
the above employees shall not be required to handle any lithographic
work "farmed out" by such employer, other than work which the con-
tracting employer has customarily performed for the struck employer.
The general statement, if standing alone, would be unlawful because
it embodies more than the "ally" doctrine. 9 However, the general
statement must be read together with and in the context of the imple-
mentation clause. According to the latter, employees are not to be
required to handle farmed out "struck work," unless the contract-
ing employer has customarily performed such work for the struck
employer. We read the two clauses, the general with the particular, as
embodying nothing more than the Board and the court sanctioned
"ally" doctrine which Congress clearly intended to preserve. As so
construed, the "struck work" paragraph is lawful."0
With respect to the "Chain Shop" provision (Section 20) the Board
stated:
'"Chain Shop"
This clause in substance recognizes the right of employees to strike
if employees in another lithographic plant "wholly owned and con-
trolled by the company or commonly owned and controlled" are on
strike or have been locked out. In the recent Alexander Warehouse
case,"' the Board held that, where a dispute existed at one of three,
geographically separated plants of an employer, picketing at the plants
where no dispute existed was lawful, primary activity. The above clause
therefore merely embodies the union's statutory right, unless the refer-
ence to a company "commonly owned and controlled" extends the
right to strike beyond the statutory permission, that is, to a situation
where the company at which a primary strike occurs is not a single
employer together with the contracting company at which the sym-
pathy strike occurs. However, in the Dearborn Oil & Gas case,3" the
Board said:
Generally speaking, in those unfair labor practice cases in which
the Board and the courts have held that a legal entity may be
held for the acts of another, because both constituted a single
employer, it appeared that both were not only subject to corn-
29 NLRB v. Business Mach. & Office Appliance Mechanics Bd., 228 F.2d 553 (2d Cir.
1955); Douds v. Metropolitan Fed'n of Architects, 75 F. Supp. 672 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
s Legislative History of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 942,
1007, 1389 (U.S. Gov't Printing Oflfice 1959). The present clause is significantly different from
the "struck work" clause in the San Francisco case. In the latter, the "struck work" clause
precluded the contracting employer from doing not only farmed out "struck work," but
also work customarily done for the struck employer. In the present case, the clause speci-
fically preserves the employer's right to continue to do work which the employer has cus-
tomarily done for the struck employer.
3'Teamsters Union (Alexander Warehouse & Sales Co.), 128 N.L.R.B. 916 (1960).




mon control, but also that a controlling ownership interest in
both companies was held by the same individual or group of in-
dividuals. (Emphasis supplied)
Centralized control of labor relations is a factor frequently stressed
by the Board in finding common control of separate legal entities.
Accordingly, we construe the "chain shop" clause as saying that, a
strike at the plant of the contracting employer in sympathy with a
strike at the plant of another company which is a separate legal entity
is permitted, provided that, the two legal entities because of common
control and ownership as the Board uses these terms, constitute a
single employer within the meaning of the Act. Such a clause is there-
fore lawful.
The Board also found the "Right to Terminate" clause (Section
21) to be valid and said: "As we have found that the 'struck work'
clause is lawful, the 'right to terminate' clause intended to give the
Union a remedy for the breach of the former is equally lawful."
The most difficult questions under 8 (e), however, will arise in con-
nection with subcontracting clauses, which prohibit employers from
subcontracting work which is normally done within the bargaining
unit, and picket line clauses which allow employees to refrain from
crossing a picket line. In the Minnesota Milk Co. case, 3 the Board
stated in part as follows:
Finally, we do not agree with the broad conclusions,, of the Trial
Examiner that Section 8 (e) bars all agreements prohibiting the sub-
contracting of work. The Trial Examiner states:
It is clear from this legislative history that Congress clearly in-
tended as a matter of public policy thereby [the enactment of
Section 8 (e)] to outlaw not only traditional "hot cargo" clauses
in contracts made by the Teamsters and other unions in the
transportation industry, but beyond that all similar clauses which
directly or indirectly required an employer to cease doing business
by contract, subcontract or in any other manner, with any other
person.
We find no justification in the statute for so sweeping a generaliza-
tion. With respect to contracts and agreements prohibiting an em-
ployer from the contracting or subcontracting out of work regularly
performed by his employees we shall examine each such contract or
agreement as it comes before us. The language used, the intent of the
parties and the scope of the restriction vary greatly in such agree-
ments and each must meet scrutiny in terms of the statutory restraint
on its own.
Subcontracting contracts, it can safely be predicted, will provide
an area for important debate and litigation.
" Milk Drivers & Dairy Employees Union (Minnesota Milk Co.), 133 N.L.R.B. No.
123, 49 L.R.R.M. 1001 (1961).
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APPENDIX
NLRB Decisions Governing Validity of Clauses Under 8(e)
Amalgamated Lithographers of America, 130 N.L.R.B. No. 102, 47
L.R.R.M. 1374 (1961), held the following clauses to be invalid and
violative of Section 8 (e) :
SECTION 22. TRADE SHOP WORKS: (a) The parties agree that all
the terms of this contract have been negotiated on the assumption that all
lithographic production work will be done under approved union wages
and conditions. In the event any employer covered by this contract re-
quests any employee to handle any lithographic production work made in
any shop which was not under contract with the Amalgamated Lithog-
raphers of America and authorized to use the union label of the Amal-
gamated, then the Union in its discretion by notice in writing, may
re-open the contract as to that employer for negotiations as to the whole
or any part thereof. In the event of failure to agree on all terms within
ten days after such re-opening, the Union shall have the right to terminate
the contract forthwith as to that employer by giving written notice to
such employer.
(b) Union trade shops must affix the Union label on all their products
before sending them to any other shop.
(c) Finished lithographic press press plates which are sent out of any
plant (unless for regraining) shall have the Union label and the name
of the plant in the plate, except that as to plates heretofore made this
may be done by otherwise attaching the Union label and name of the
plant to the plate. Any negatives or positives sent out of a plant shall bear
the Union label and the name of the plant.
(d) Upon request by the shop delegate an employer shall advise him of
the source of any lithographic work brought into the plant from the
outside. Such request shall not interfere with the normal production of
the plant.
SECTION 23. STRUCK WORK: (a) The Employers agree that they
will not render assistance to any lithographic employer any of whose
plants is struck by any Local of the Amalgamated Lithographers of
America or the International or where members of any such Local or
the International are locked out, and accordingly agree that in imple-
mentation of this purpose the employees covered by this contract shall
not be requested to handle any lithographic work (other than work
actually in process in the plant) customarily produced by such employer.
(b) The Employers agree that the employees covered by this contract
shall not be requested to handle any work in any plant if in another
plant of any employer or of any subsidiary of such employer in any
part of the United States or Canada any Local of the Amalgamated
Lithographers of America or the International is on strike or members of
such Local or the International are locked out.
SECTION 24. TERMINATION: In the event an employer requests
any employee to handle any work described in paragraph (Section 23)
above, or requests any employee to handle any work received from or
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destined for any employer involved in such strike or lockout, directly or
indirectly (other than work actually in process in the plant), the Union,
in addition to the other rights and remedies the employees and the Union
have under this contract or the law, shall have the right in its discretion
to terminate the contract forthwith as to that employer by giving written
notice to said employer.
SECTION 25. REFUSAL TO HANDLE: The Employers agree that
they will not discharge, discipline or discriminate against any employee
because such employee refuses to handle any lithographic production work
which was made in a shop not under contract with the Amalgamated
Lithographers of America or not authorized to use the union label of the
Amalgamated or because such employee refused to handle any struck
lithographic work of the type described in Sections 23 and 24.
Amalgamated Lithographers of America (Employing Lithographers
of Greater Miami, Florida), 130 N.L.R.B. No. 107, 47 L.R.R.M.
1380 (1961), held the following clauses to be lawful:
STRUCK WORK
Section 19. The company agrees that it will not render production
assistance to any lithographic employer, any of whose plants is struck
by any local of the Amalgamated Lithographers of America or the Inter-
national, or where members of any such local or the International are
locked out, and accordingly agrees that in implementation of this purpose
the employees covered by this contract shall not be required to handle
any lithographic work farmed out directly or indirectly by such employer,
other than work which the employer herein customarily has performed
for the employer involved in such strike or lock-out.
CHAIN SHOP
Section 20. Each Company agrees that its employees shall not be re-
quested to handle any work in the plant covered by this contract if in
another lithographic plant which is wholly owned and controlled by the
company or commonly owned and controlled, in any part of the United
States or Canada, any Local of the Amalgamated Lithographers of Ameri-
ca is on strike, or members of such Local or International are locked out.
RIGHT TO TERMINATE
Section 21. In the event the Company requests any employee to handle
any work described in Section 19 above, the Union, in addition to the
other rights and remedies the employees and the Union have under this
contract or the law, shall have the right in its discretion to terminate the
contract forthwith by giving written notice to the company.
Local 107, Teamsters Union (E. A. Gallagher & Sons), 131 N.L.R.B.
No. 117, 48 L.R.R.M. 1158 (1961), found the following contract
provisions unlawful under Section 8 (e) :
Paragraph 9: Article VII of the current contract shall be amended so
as to provide in addition that it is the Operator's obligation to see that
all trucks arriving in this area from over the road are brought to the
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terminal before making any delivery or pickup unless otherwise agreed
upon.
ARTICLE VII: All local area operation work which in the past, MTLR,
Operator, and a particular Union agree should or was to be performed
solely by employees covered by this Agreement shall be performed by
employees represented by Union.
ARTICLE XVII: Local area operations include all work performed
within the city of Philadelphia or within a radius of forty (40) miles
from City Hall, Philadelphia.
ARTICLE XXI: No Operator may lease or hire outside equipment to
supplement his own equipment unless all of Operator's available, useable
equipment is working. No outside driver shall be permitted to operate
leased or hired equipment unless and until all available employees on the
seniority list of Operators have been assigned to work in seniority list
order; this provision shall not apply to specialized equipment not normally
driven by Operator's employees. When Operator leases or hires equip-
ment with a driver, operator shall give first preference to employers having
a contract with a local of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America.
Merchandising & Distribution Employees Union (American Feed
Co.), 133 N.L.R.B. No. 23, 48 L.R.R.M. 1622 (1961), found the
following clause unlawful and prohibited by Section 8 (e):
There is hereby excluded from the job duties, course of employment or
work of employees covered by this agreement, any work whatsoever in
connection with the handling or performing any service whatsoever on
goods, products or materials coming from or going to the premises of an
Employer where there is any controversy with a Union.
Operating Engineers Union (Vandenberg Development Corp.), 131
N.L.R.B. No. 75, 48 L.R.R.M. 1081 (1961), involved employers in
the construction industry. The Board upheld the validity of the
following clause:
1-D. If the CONTRACTORS, parties hereto, sub-contract job site
work falling within the recognized jurisdiction of the UNION, pro-
vision shall be made in such sub-contract for the compliance by said
sub-contractor with terms not less than those contained herein. A sub-
contractor is defined as any person, firm or corporation who agrees, under
contract with the general contractor or his sub-contractor, to perform
on the job site any part or portion of the work covered by this Agreement,
including the operating of equipment, performance of labor, and the
furnishing and installation of materials.
In the Brown Transp. Corp. (Teamsters Union) (10-CE- 1, 10-
CC-460) case, the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations
Board challenged the legality of the following Protection-of-Rights
clause and a Trial Examiner ruled the clause to be illegal:
1962]
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SECTION A. PROTECTION OF RIGHTS
1. Picket Line. It shall not be a violation of this Agreement and it shall
not be cause for discharge or disciplinary action in the event an employee
refuses to enter upon any property involved in a labor dispute or refuses
to go through or work behind any picket line, including the picket lines
of Unions party to this Agreement and including picket lines at the
Employer's place or places of business.
2. Struck Goods. Recognizing that many individual employees covered
by this contract may have personal convictions against aiding the adver-
sary of other workers, and recognizing the propriety of individual deter-
mination by an individual workman as to whether he shall perform work,
labor or service which he deems contrary to his best interests, the parties
recognize and agree that:
It shall not be a violation of this Agreement and it shall not be a cause
for discharge or disciplinary action if any employee refuses to perform
any service which, but for the existence of a controversy between a labor
union and any other person (whether party to this Agreement or not),
would be performed by the employees of such person.
Likewise, it shall not be a violation of this Agreement and it shall not
be a cause for discharge or disciplinary action if any employee refuses
to handle any goods or equipment transported, interchanged, handled or
used by any carrier or other person, whether a part to this Agreement or
not, at any of whose terminals or places of business there is a controversy
between such carrier, or person, or its employees on the one hand and a
labor union on the other hand; and such rights may be exercised where
such goods or equipment are being transported, handled or used by the
originating, interchanging or succeeding carriers or persons, whether
parties to this Agreement or not.
The Employer agrees that it will not cease or refrain from handling,
using, transporting, or otherwise dealing in any of the products of any
other employer or cease doing business with any other person, or fail in
any obligation imposed by the Motor Carriers' Act or other applicable
law, as a result of individual employees exercising their rights under this
Agreement or under law, but the Employer shall, notwithstanding any
other provision in this Agreement, when necessary, handle, use, transport
or otherwise deal in such products and continue doing such business by
use of other employees (including management and representatives),
other carriers, or by any other method it deems appropriate or proper.
3. Grievances. Within five (5) working days of filing of grievance
claiming violation of this Article - the parties to this Agree-
ment shall proceed to the final step (Article - , Sections__
( ) and ( ) of the Grievance Procedure, without
taking any intermediate steps, any other provisions of this Agreement to
the contrary notwithstanding.
4. Sympathetic Action. In the event of a labor dispute between any
Employer or Union, party to this Agreement, during the course of
which such Union engages in lawful economic activities which are not
in violation of this Agreement, then any other affiliate of the International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of
America having an agreement with such Employer shall have the right
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to engage in lawful economic activity against such Employer in support
of the Union which is party to this Agreement notwithstanding anything
to the contrary in the Agreement between such Employer and such
other affiliate.
Section B contained a Protection-of-Rights Clause which the Gen-
eral Counsel stipulated may be enforced pending determination of
the validity of Section A:
SECTION B. SAVINGS CLAUSE
Pending a determination by the National Labor Relations Board that
the above Article , Section A, is valid, or in the event of a
determination by such Board that such Article is invalid, then pending
final determination by the Court, the Union and the Employer shall
comply with and enforce only the following modification thereof:
1. Picket Line. It shall not be a violation of this Agreement, and it
shall not be cause for discharge or disciplinary action in the event an
employee refuses to enter upon any property involved in a lawful primary
labor dispute, or refuses to go through or work behind any lawful pri-
mary picket line, including the lawful primary picket line of Unions
party to this Agreement, and including lawful primary picket lines at
the Employer's places of business.
2. Struck Goods. It shall not be a violation of this Agreement and it
shall not be a cause for discharge or disciplinary action if any employee
refuses to perform any service which his employer undertakes to perform
for an Employer or person whose employees are on strike, and which
service, but for such strike, would be performed by the employees of
the Employer or person on strike.
3. Grievances. Within five (5) working days of filing of grievance
claiming violation of this Article, the parties to this Agreement shall
proceed to the final step (Article-, Section -) of the grievance
procedure, without taking any intermediate steps, any other provision of
this Agreement to the contrary notwithstanding.
4. Sympathetic Action. In the event of a labor dispute between any
Employer or Union, party to this Agreement, during the course of which
such Union engages in lawful economic activities which are not in viola-
tion of this Agreement, then any other affiliate of the International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffers, Warehousemen and Helpers of
America having an Agreement with such Employer shall have the right
to engage in lawful economic activity against such Employer in support
of the Union which is party to this Agreement notwithstanding anything
to the contrary in the Agreement beween such Employer and such other
affiliate.
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